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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. An important question of state law that has not 
been, but should be, settled by this Court is whether a 
commercial tenant is an "implied coinsured" under a landlord's 
fire insurance policy simply because a provision in the lease 
agreement requires the landlord to provide fire insurance on the 
leased premises. 
Specifically, as that question relates to this 
matter, did the Court of Appeals err in affirming a Summary 
Judgment for Salt Lake County on the basis that the County, as 
the commercial tenant, immunized itself against liability for its 
own negligence in causing the fire to the leased building merely 
because it inserted a provision in the lease agreement that it 
drafted requiring the landlord to carry fire insurance? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the 
Summary Judgment for Salt Lake County where there is a genuine 
issue of material fact whether the parties intended to exempt 
Salt Lake County from its own negligence and where the Court of 
Appeals ignored the crucial fact that the County drafted the 
lease agreement, which lacked any explicit language clearly 
indicating an intent to exempt the County from liability for its 
own negligence but which contained two crucial provisions largely 
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ignored by the Court of Appeals demonstrating that the parties 
intended the County to be liable for its own negligence? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the 
Summary Judgment for Salt Lake County as to all of the 
subrogation claims where some of those claims were brought by 
virtue of insurance policies issued to other tenants who were not 
even parties to the lease agreement? 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter is 
reported at 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 74 (Ct. App. 6/26/89). A copy of 
that Opinion is included in the Appendix (at pages 1-7) to this 
Petition. 
JURISDICTION 
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals was issued on June 
26, 1989. 
On July 21, 1989, Petitioners' attorneys filed with 
this Court a Motion for a 30-day extension of time until August 
25, 1989 to file this Petition for Writ of Certiorari. This 
Court entered an Order on July 21, 1989 granting that Motion. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a), 78-2-2(5) and 78-2a-4. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This action involves a dispute between Salt Lake 
County, as tenant, and Safeco Insurance Company ("Safeco"), as 
the insurer of the landlord [Plaintiff-Appellant and Petitioner 
("Fashion Place")], in a subrogation claim for damages resulting 
from a fire that destroyed the leased premises known as the 
Fashion Place Professional Building ("the Building"). It is 
claimed that Salt Lake County negligently caused the fire to the 
Building. [Clerk's Record Index ("CR") I486, 1492-93] 
Petitioners either had an ownership interest in the 
Building or were tenants in the Building at the time of the fire. 
Safeco insured, under various separate insurance policies, 
Petitioners1 interest in the Building and Petitioners' interest 
in personal property located in the Building. Some of the claims 
are subrogated claims by Safeco, brought in Petitioners' names, 
to recover sums paid Petitioners for damage to their real and 
personal property and for business interruption losses. In 
addition to Safeco's subrogated claims, Petitioners also made 
claim for uninsured losses. 
Salt Lake County moved for summary judgment on the 
ground that it was an "implied coinsured" under the Safeco 
insurance policy and that all subrogation claims under all Safeco 
insurance policies should therefore be dismissed. 
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Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The trial court (Judge Judith M. Billings) originally 
denied Salt Lake County's first Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(CR 3735, 3924; APP-8^) 
However, the trial court (Judge David S. Young) 
subsequently granted Salt Lake County's renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (CR 4110; APP-21; App-29) 
A Judgment was entered in favor of Salt Lake County 
(CR 4114; App-33), and the Court of Appeals affirmed that 
Judgment. 
Statement of Facts 
In 1978, Salt Lake County entered into a lease 
agreement with Fashion Place, the owner of the Building. In 
1981, the County entered into negotiations with Fashion Place to 
renew that existing lease. The County's attorney drafted the 
lease agreement.^ (CR 3997, 4003, 4467, 4492) 
The lease agreement contained the following three 
pertinent provisions: 
Paragraph 7 — the "redelivery" provision: 
"At the expiration of the term of this 
lease, LESSEE will yield and deliver up the 
^References herein to "App" are to the Appendix in the 
Appellants' Brief filed with the Court of Appeals; references to 
"APP" are to the Appendix in this Petition. 
^The 1981 Lease Agreement is set forth in its entirety in the 
Appendix to Appellant's Brief. (App-1) 
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PREMISES to LESSOR in as good order and 
condition as when the same were entered upon 
by the LESSEE, reasonable use and wear 
thereof, damage by fire and casualty not the 
fault of LESSEE and damage by elements 
excepted therefrom." 
Paragraph 9 — the "procurement of insurance" 
provision; 
"Responsibility for utilities, taxes, 
and insurance shall be as indicated: 
"Power (L), Heat (L), Water (L), Sewer (L), 
Telephone (T), Real Property Tax (L), 
Increase in Real Property Tax (L), Fire 
Insurance on Building (L), Fire Insurance on 
Personal Property (L), Glass Insurance (L)." 
["L" stands for Landlord, "T" for Tenant] 
Paragraph 16fa) — the "indemnity" provision: 
"LESSEE shall indemnify and save LESSOR 
harmless from all loss, damage, liability, or 
expense incurred by LESSOR due to the 
exclusive negligent acts or omissions to act 
of LESSEE, its officers, employees, or agents 
arising out of LESSEE'S use or operation of 
the PREMISES and shall not permit any lien or 
other claim or demand to be enforced against 
the PREMISES by reason of LESSEE'S use of the 
PREMISES." 
(CR 2, Ex. "A" pp. 3, 5; App-3, 5; emphasis in original) 
Safeco insured Fashion Place and it also insured, under 
separate individual policies, several tenants in the Building who 
were not parties to the lease with Salt Lake County. (CR 2494-
96, 2724-26, 3899; APP-2) 
Following a fire that destroyed the Building in 1983, 
Safeco paid substantial sums to rebuild the Building and to 
compensate the owners and tenants for personal property losses 
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and business interruption losses. Then, acting as subrogee of 
the owners and tenants, Safeco instituted this lawsuit in the 
names of its insureds. In addition to Safeco's subrogated 
claims, Petitioners are also making claims against Salt Lake 
County for uninsured losses. (CR 3899; App-10, 25) 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
This Court has not previously decided, but 
should decide, the important question of 
whether a commercial tenant is an "implied 
coinsured" under a landlord's fire insurance 
policy thereby barring a subrogation action 
by the insurer against the tenant based on 
the tenant's own negligence. Where, as here, 
the lease agreement prepared by Salt Lake 
County did not contain an express provision 
relieving the tenant County from liability 
for its own negligence, the Court of Appeals 
erred in ruling that the County is an 
"implied coinsured" of the landlord simply 
because the landlord was obligated under the 
lease agreement to provide fire insurance for 
the Building. 
A crucial threshold issue in this case — one of first 
impression before this Court — is whether a tenant may immunize 
itself against liability for its own negligence merely by 
inserting a provision in a lease that it drafted requiring the 
landlord to carry fire insurance. The Court of Appeals erred in 
ruling that, absent an express provision in the lease to the 
contrary, a tenant is presumed to be a coinsured of the landlord 
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thereby barring a subrogation by the landlordfs insurer• That 
ruling is contrary to a large body of established law and sound 
public policy that opposes the contracting away of liability for 
one's own negligent acts. Consistent with that public policy, a 
lease provision requiring the landlord to provide fire insurance 
does not by itself expressly or impliedly exempt the tenant from 
liability for its own negligence by elevating the tenant to the 
status of an "implied coinsured" under the landlord's fire 
insurance policy. When the landlord and tenant have not included 
in their contract a provision clearly shifting the burden of 
negligence, a court should not indulge in a legal fiction to 
create such a provision and alter the parties' contract. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this matter is 
contrary to Utah law that disfavors a party contracting to 
protect itself against liability for loss caused by its own 
negligence. Contracts for exemption from liability for 
negligence are not favored and are strictly construed against the 
party asserting it, particularly if, as here, that party drafted 
the contract. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp.. 
9 Utah 2d 215, 220, 341 P.2d 944 (1959). It is well settled that 
courts must strictly construe contracts against a party who 
attempts to protect itself against liability for loss caused by 
8 
its own negligence, and such a contractual provision must be 
clearly and unequivocally stated. Id. —* 
Indeed, there is a presumption against an intent to 
immunize a party against its own negligence, and such intent will 
not be inferred or implied but must be clearly and unequivocally 
expressed in the contract. Particularly, such intent will not be 
inferred where, as here, the contract was drafted by the party 
seeking to be immunized from liability for its own negligence. 
On the contrary, such a contract must be strictly construed 
—'This Court presently has pending before it the case of 
Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corp.. 106 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Ct. 
App. 4/11/89) (SC 890244), which was relied on by the Court of 
Appeals in this matter and which involves the issue of the effect 
of a "procurement of insurance" provision in a purchase 
agreement. That case, however, was a breach of contract case, 
which this matter is not, in which one party failed to procure 
the insurance. At issue in that case is whether a particular 
provision in a purchase agreement obligated the party to procure 
insurance covering the financial consequences of the other 
party's own negligence. Significantly, the Court in Pickhover 
expressly noted that "the lack of explicit language clearly 
indicating an intent to provide coverage for [a party's] own 
negligence may leave open the question of whether such coverage 
was intended" and that such an "ambiguity" is then resolved 
through well-settled principles of contract interpretation. 106 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 47 n.4. In this matter, however, the Court of 
Appeals ignored well-settled principles of contract 
interpretation in ruling that the lease agreement is not 
ambiguous. Infra at pp. 11-16. 
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against that party. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. El Paso 
Natural Gas Co.. 17 Utah 2d 255, 259, 408 P.2d 910 (1965).^ 
The primary case upon which the Court of Appeals relied 
in this matter is Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA Alaska Commun., 623 P.2d 
1216 (Alaska 1981). In ruling that the tenant was an "implied 
coinsured" of the landlord, the court in that case stated that it 
believed "that in a situation of this type it would be 
undesirable as a matter of public policy to permit the risk of 
loss from a fire negligently caused by a tenant to fall upon the 
tenant rather than the landlord's insurer." 623 P.2d at 1219 
(footnote omitted). The only "public policy" identified by the 
court in Alaska Ins. was a potential reduction of litigation if 
casualty insurers were precluded from seeking to recoup payments 
from negligent tortfeasors. The court did not address why a 
casualty insurer should be treated differently from any other 
insurer that pays an insured claim and subrogates against the 
negligent tortfeasor. The court also did not address the 
countervailing public policy that a negligent party should not be 
able to immunize itself from liability for its own negligence 
absent an express unequivocal provision. Finally, the court did 
not address why it was good public policy for an innocent insurer 
^See also Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 18 Utah 2d 263, 420 P.2d 
848 (1966); Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 P.2d 207 
(1965); Kidman v. White. 14 Utah 2d 142, 378 P.2d 898 (1963); 
Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P.2d 
928 (1962); Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 273, 323 P.2d 
258 (1958); Jankele v. Texas. 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425 (1936). 
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of an innocent landlord to bear the loss while the tortfeasor 
escapes liability.^ 
Public policy opposes the contracting away of liability 
for future negligent acts unless such intentions are clearly and 
unequivocally expressed. This Court has implied that an 
agreement to procure insurance is not sufficient to excuse a 
party from liability for its own negligence. DuBois v. Nye. 584 
P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978) To do as the Court of Appeals did and 
adopt the rule that a lease provision requiring the landlord to 
provide insurance exempts a negligent tenant from liability would 
be a drastic departure from previously established law and public 
policy. This Court should reverse the ruling of the Court of 
Appeals in this matter and instead rule that a landlord's 
agreement to provide fire insurance does not elevate the tenant 
to the status of an "implied coinsured" under the landlord's 
insurance policy and does not relieve the tenant from liability 
for its own negligence. 
-
/The dissenting opinion in Alaska Ins.. supra, by the Chief 
Justice of the Alaska Supreme Court is instructive to this matter 
in that it is consistent with strong public policy and therefore 
commends itself to this Court. See 623 P.2d at 1220. That 
dissenting opinion is particularly instructive to this matter 
because this matter, like the Alaska Ins. case, was decided by 
summary judgment, and the Chief Justice concluded, as the trial 
court initially and correctly did in this matter, that genuine 
issues of material fact regarding the parties' intent precluded a 
summary judgment for the tenant. See Section II, infra, pp. Il-
ls. 
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II 
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 
Summary Judgment for Salt Lake County in that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact 
whether the parties intended to exempt the 
County from liability for its own negligence. 
The Court of Appeals ignored the crucial fact 
that the County drafted the lease agreement, 
which lacked any language clearly indicating 
an intent to exempt the County from liability 
for its own negligence but which contained 
two crucial provisions largely ignored by the 
Court of Appeals demonstrating that the 
parties intended the County to be liable for 
its own negligence. 
It is significant that, in denying Salt Lake County's 
initial Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court (Judge 
Billings) ruled that "the parties to the lease should be able to 
contract around [the] presumption [that the tenant is a coinsured 
of the landlord thereby barring a subrogation action by the 
insurer against its own insured] * * * [and that] it appears that 
the parties attempted to do just that." (APP-19) Accordingly, 
the trial court correctly denied Summary Judgment for Salt Lake 
County on the basis that there was a genuine issue of material 
fact as to the parties' intentions. However, in ruling on the 
County's second Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court 
(Judge Young) erroneously granted Summary Judgment for the County 
on the basis that the evidence as to the parties' intentions 
established "that there was no expressed intent * * * to reserve 
to [Safeco] the right to subrogate against Salt Lake County." 
(APP-25) 
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It is also significant that Judge Billings expressly 
stated that, "[i]n considering the redelivery and indemnity 
provisions [Paragraphs 7 and 16(a)] in conjunction with the 
insurance clause [Paragraph 9], the Court finds that there is an 
ambiguity in the lease." (APP-16-17) Judge Billings also 
expressly noted that "the lease at issue in this case is not an 
adhesion contract; rather, it was prepared and drafted by 
attorneys for Salt Lake County." (APP-19 n. 6) 
The Court of Appeals acknowledged in its Opinion in 
this matter the correct standard of review of a Summary Judgment 
such that all facts and inferences must be construed in a light 
most favorable to Petitioners.^ However, the Court then went on 
to essentially ignore that standard of review in affirming the 
Summary Judgment for Salt Lake County. In ruling that there is 
not a material issue of fact as to the parties1 intent, or 
perhaps in an effort to avoid even dealing with the issue of the 
parties' intent, the Court of Appeals reached the startling 
conclusion that the lease agreement is unambiguous. 
The ruling by the Court of Appeals simply cannot 
withstand careful scrutiny. Significantly, the Court focused on 
-'See, e.g., Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 763 P.2d 
761 (Utah 1988), in which this Court held that on an appeal from 
the grant of a summary judgment, "we review the facts and 
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the party against whom summary judgment was granted fid, at 
763), and that "[c]ourts cannot weigh disputed material facts in 
ruling on a summary judgment motion" fid, at 765). 
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only two of the three crucial lease provisions — the 
"redelivery" and "procurement of insurance" provisions — and 
completely ignored the "indemnity" provision in the lease 
agreement. The Court acknowledged that the "redelivery" and 
"procurement of insurance" provisions "may seem inconsistent" but 
then went on and held that "they actually are not." (APP-4) 
Perhaps by comparing just the two contractual 
provisions noted by the Court of Appeals, one might be able to 
somehow conclude that there is not an ambiguity between those two 
provisions. However, when one also considers the "indemnity" 
provision that was ignored by the Court of Appeals, there is at 
least an issue of fact, as Judge Billings initially ruled, that 
the parties intended that the tenant would be liable for its own 
negligence. The "redelivery" and "indemnity" provisions 
construed together along with the fact that the lease was not an 
adhesion contract but was prepared and drafted by Salt Lake 
County's attorneys (a significant fact entirely overlooked by the 
Court of Appeals) compel a reversal of the Summary Judgment in 
this matter. Particularly when that evidence is construed in a 
light most favorable to Plaintiffs, there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the parties' intent regarding the liability 
of the County for fire damage caused by its own negligence. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this matter is 
even more puzzling considering that the same Court in Pickhover 
v. Smith's Management Corp., supra, even noted that the lack of 
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explicit language clearly indicating an attempt to exonerate a 
party from its own negligence "may leave open the question of 
whether such coverage was intended" and that such an "ambiguity" 
is then resolved through well-settled principles of contract 
interpretation. 
Several factors considered important by Judge Billings 
in her initial ruling in this matter were ignored by the Court of 
Appeals: (1) Salt Lake County, not Petitioners, drafted the 
lease agreement; (2) the County inserted into the lease agreement 
a "redelivery" provision that expressly and unambiguously 
provides that the County is responsible for its own negligence; 
and (3) the County also inserted into the lease agreement an 
"indemnity" provision that expressly and unambiguously provides 
that the County is responsible for indemnifying the landlord for 
all loss or damage incurred by the landlord due to the County's 
negligence in connection with its use or operation of the 
Building. Thus, well-settled principles of contract 
interpretation compel a reversal of the Summary Judgment in favor 
of the County in this matter. 
The "redelivery" and "indemnity" provisions inserted in 
the lease agreement by Salt Lake County clearly establish that 
the County is liable for loss by fire caused by its own 
negligence. The contrary ruling by the Court of Appeals ignores 
the clear language of those two provisions and, in particular, 
renders useless the phrase "not the fault of LESSEE" contained in 
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the "redelivery" provision. This Court stated in DuBois v. Nye, 
supra, that a court should "not torture the language [of a 
contract] to find a construction that will justify immunity where 
none was intended." 584 P.2d at 827. However, given the fact 
that Salt Lake County drafted the lease agreement without any 
clear or unequivocal expression of immunity from liability for 
its own negligence, and particularly given the fact of the 
unambiguous "redelivery" and "indemnity" provisions in the lease 
agreement, the decision of the Court of Appeals emasculates the 
lease agreement and the intention of the parties. 
The Summary Judgment for Salt Lake County is incorrect 
because the lease agreement should be construed against the 
County as the drafter of the lease, and the lease agreement, 
considered in its entirety, supports the conclusion that the 
County is liable for its own negligence. In any event, there is 
at least an ambiguity between the pertinent contractual 
provisions in the lease agreement that should be construed 
against the County as the drafter of the lease or that ambiguity 
should be resolved by determining the parties' intent. 
As set forth in Appellants' Brief (at pp. 27-30), there 
is evidence which, construed in a light most favorable to 
Petitioners, would enable a jury to reasonably find that Salt 
Lake County intentionally inserted the "redelivery" and 
"indemnity" provisions in the lease agreement and that the 
"procurement of insurance" provision was inserted in the lease 
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agreement without any intent to waive Safeco's subrogation 
rights. That evidence, construed in a light most favorable to 
Petitioners, clearly demonstrates a material issue of fact as to 
the intent of the parties concerning Salt Lake County's liability 
for its own negligence. The Court of Appeals, however, simply 
ignored crucial facts and erroneously concluded that the lease 
agreement is unambiguous. 
III. 
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 
Summary Judgment for Salt Lake County as to 
all of the subrogation claims where some of 
those claims were brought by virtue of 
insurance policies issued to other tenants 
who were not even parties to the lease 
agreement. 
While the Court of Appeals made note of the significant 
fact that some of the subrogation claims were brought by virtue 
of insurance policies issued to tenants of the Building who were 
not even parties to the lease agreement involving Salt Lake 
County (APP-2), the Court simply concluded that Salt Lake County, 
as tenant, "also stands in the shoes of the insured landlord for 
purposes of subrogation claims brought in the names of tenants 
not parties to the lease." (APP-6) 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Summary Judgment as 
to all subrogation claims on the basis that "[w]hen Safeco agreed 
to provide insurance for the building, it assumed the risk of its 
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coinsureds' negligence." (Id.)±/ A fatal flaw of the Summary 
Judgment is that it is based on a theory (the coinsured waiver of 
subrogation theory) that cannot apply to claims that were brought 
by virtue of insurance policies issued to other tenants who were 
not parties to the lease involving Salt Lake County. Safeco 
should not be precluded from bringing subrogation actions based 
on policies that were issued to tenants who were not even parties 
to that lease.^ 
Thus, even if Salt Lake County is presumed to be an 
"implied coinsured" under Safeco7s insurance policy, that status 
-^ The Court of Appeals erroneously relied on the decision of this 
Court in Bd. of Ed. of Jordan Sch. Dist. v. Hales, 566 P.2d 1246 
(Utah 1977). The decision in that case did not deal with 
insurance policies issued to other tenants who were not parties 
to the lease. That decision dealt with an agreement to provide 
insurance coverage to certain contractors and subcontractors. 
The insurer paid for damage to the negligent subcontractor7s 
property under one portion of the policy coverage while at the 
same time attempting to subrogate against the negligent 
subcontractor on the ground that the subcontractor was not 
insured under the liability coverage of the same policy. That is 
not the case in this matter. Also, unlike Hales, Salt Lake 
County is not a named insured under the insurance policy. 
***While this Court has not previously addressed this issue, 
several courts have held that an "implied coinsured" is insured 
only to the extent of the interest and coverage agreed upon and 
that an insurer can therefore subrogate for losses beyond the 
extent of the contractual agreement. See Turner Const. Co. v. 
John B. Kelly Co., 442 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Paul Tishman 
Co. v. Carney & Del Guidice, Inc., 36 A.D.2d 273, 320 N.Y.S.2d 
396 (1971), aff'd 34 N.Y.2d 941, 316 N.E.2d 875, 359 N.Y.S.2d 561 
(1974) ; McBroome-Bennett Plumbing, Inc. v. Villa France, Inc., 
515 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Public Serv. Co. of Okl. v. 
Black & Veatch, Consul. Ena., 328 F. Supp. 14 (N.D. Okl. 1971); 
Baltimore Contract., Inc. v. Circle Floor Co. of Wash., Inc., 318 
F. Supp. 106 (D. Md. 1970) ; Employers' Fire Insurance Co., 
Boston, Mass. v. Behunin, 275 F. Supp. 399 (D. Colo. 1967). 
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Thus, even if Salt Lake County is presumed to be an 
"implied coinsured" under Safeco's insurance policy, that status 
should be limited to the portion of the Building leased to the 
County. Safeco should be able to bring subrogation actions to 
recover payments made to insureds for damage to those insureds' 
personal property and for business interruption losses suffered 
by those insureds, none of whom were parties to the lease 
agreement involving the County. In addition, Safeco should be 
allowed to bring a subrogation action to recover any business 
interruption losses paid to Fashion Place, because the insurance 
provision in the lease agreement makes no reference whatsoever to 
business interruption insurance. 
Accordingly, the Summary Judgment awarded Salt Lake 
County was, if not totally flawed, at least overbroad and should 
be reversed insofar as it granted Judgment on claims that were 
brought by virtue of insurance policies issued to other tenants 
who were not parties to the lease agreement involving Salt Lake 
County. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Judgment entered in favor of Salt Lake County 
should be reversed and a judgment should be entered in favor of 
Petitioners orf in the alternative, the matter should be remanded 
to the trial court. 
DATED: August 18, 1989. 
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DAVIDSON, Judge: 
This appeal involves a dispute between Salt Lake County 
Mental Health (Salt Lake County), as tenant, and Safeco 
Insurance Company (Safeco), as the landlord's insurer, in a 
subrogation claim for damages resulting from a fire that 
destroyed the leased premises. The trial court found that Salt 
Lake County was an implied coinsured under the terms of the 
lease thereby barring subrogation by Safeco. Safeco, in the 
name of the landlord, Fashion Place Investors (Fashion Place), 
appeals from summary judgment granted in favor of Salt Lake 
County. We affirm. 
FACTS 
In 1978, Salt Lake County leased office space in the 
Fashion Place Professional Building (Building). Four years 
later, Fashion Place Investors purchased the Building and Salt 
Lake County negotiated a new lease. The new lease provided 
that it was the landlord's responsibility to obtain fire 
insurance on the Building. Accordingly, Fashion Place obtained 
insurance coverage through Safeco. In addition, Safeco 
insured, through separate individual policies, several tenants 
in the Building. These tenants were not parties to the lease 
with defendant. 
On May 1, 1983, a fire destroyed the Building. Safeco 
paid Fashion Place and the individual tenants for the loss 
pursuant to its insurance policies, and then commenced a 
subrogation action against Salt Lake County contending that 
Salt Lake County, acting through its employees, negligently 
caused the fire. Salt Lake County argued that it is an implied 
coinsured of Safeco, which precludes Safeco from exercising its 
subrogation claim. 
The trial court initially denied Salt Lake County's 
motion for summary judgment. Although the court agreed that 
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Salt Lake County was presumed a coinsured, and that an insurer 
is barred from pursuing any claims against its insured, the 
material issue of fact remaining was whether Salt Lake County 
and Fashion Place had expressly contracted that Salt Lake 
County would assume responsibility for fire damage resulting 
from its negligence. Because the the trial court concluded 
that the provisions in the lease were ambiguous, extrinsic 
evidence was required to determine the parties* intent. 
Following discovery, Salt Lake County filed another motion for 
summary judgment. The court determined from the affidavits and 
depositions that the parties did not expressly intend to 
contract around the presumption that Salt Lake County was a 
coinsured. Furthermore, the court ruled that certain 
paragraphs in the lease constituted pre-loss releases by 
Fashion Place of any subrogation claims that Safeco may have 
had as a result of the fire. 
Fashion Place argues on appeal that the trial court erred 
in ruling that Salt Lake County is a coinsured of the 
landlord. Fashion Place contends that a lease provision 
requiring the landlord to provide fire insurance does not by 
itself expressly or impliedly exempt the tenant from the 
financial consequences of its own negligence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a summary judgment, we analyze the facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the losing party. 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 
1987). Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, 
we review the trial court's conclusions of law for 
correctness. I&. If a trial court interprets a contract as a 
matter of law, that interpretation is not afforded any 
particular deference on appeal. Power Sys. & Controls, Inc. v. 
Keith's Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9 (Utah App. 1988). 
However, if the contract is ambiguous and the trial court makes 
findings of fact from extrinsic evidence, this court's review 
is strictly limited. Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker 
Appliance & Furniture Co.. 770 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1988). 
Correspondingly, if the contract is ambiguous, but the case is 
decided on summary judgment, we can affirm only if the 
undisputed material facts, concerning the parties1 intent, 
demonstrate the successful litigant's position is correct as a 
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
The threshold question of whether or not a lease is 
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ambiguous is itself a question of law. Seashores Inc. v. 
Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 648 (Utah App. 1987) (Orme, J., 
concurring). See also Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 
1293 (Utah 1983). Thus, we must determine, as a matter of law, 
whether the lease is ambiguous before we determine whether it 
was even necessary to resort to extrinsic factual evidence in 
this case. Id. 
The pivotal sections of the lease provide: 
7. At the expiration of the term of this 
lease, LESSEE will yield and deliver up 
the PREMISES to LESSOR in as good order 
and condition as when the same were 
entered upon by the LESSEE, reasonable use 
and wear thereof, damage by fire and 
casualty not the fault of LESSEE and 
damage by elements excepted therefrom. 
9. Responsibility for utilities, taxes 
and insurance shall be as indicated: 
Power (L), Heat (L), Water (L), Sewer (L), 
Telephone (T), Real Property Tax (L), 
Increase in Real Property Tax (L), Fire 
Insurance on Building (L), Fire Insurance 
on Personal Property (L), Glass Insurance 
(L). [L stands for landlord, T for 
tenant.] 
(Emphasis added.) Although these provisions may seem 
inconsistent, they actually are not. In paragraph 7, the 
parties agree that, as between themselves, the tenant bears the 
loss for damage resulting from fires which are its fault. 
However, in paragraph 9, the parties agree to relieve the 
tenant from the practical risk posed by that legal 
responsibility through the device of fire insurance provided by 
the landlord. This interpretation is consistent with the 
modern trend, as adopted by numerous jurisdictions in recent 
years, see e.g. Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA Alaska Communications, 
Inc.. 623 P.2d 1216, 1218 n.l (Alaska 1981), to deny a cause of 
action to landlords and the right of subrogation to their 
insurers, when the landlord covenants to carry fire insurance 
on the leased premises. This includes instances where the 
lease contains provisions ostensibly holding the tenant 
responsible for fires caused by its own negligence. Id. 
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Recently, this court decided a similar dispute in 
Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corp., 771 P.2d 664 (Utah App. 
1981) . In Pickhover, the issue on appeal was whether the 
insurance provision of a purchase agreement required the buyer 
to insure the seller against the financial consequences of its 
own negligence. !£. at 666. Pickhover addressed two aspects 
of the typical agreement to provide insurance, both of which 
cast doubt on the modern day applicability of the "strict 
construction- rule to such agreements.1 The aspect discussed 
that is the most pertinent to this case is the protection of 
the bargained-for expectations of the parties. 
An agreement to insure is an agreement to 
provide both parties with the benefits of 
insurance. Individuals understand that 
insurance will protect them against the 
consequences of their own negligence and 
more than likely assume that if one . . . 
agrees as part of his or its [contractual] 
duties to provide insurance, that the 
insurance will protect both of them 
regardless of the cause of the loss. . . . 
If that were not their intent, each would 
provide his or its own protection. . . . 
Id. at 669 (quoting South Tippecanoe School Bldo. v. Shambauoh 
& Son, Inc., 182 Ind. App. 350, 395 N.E.2d 320, 327 (1979)) 
(emphasis added). Since Fashion Place agreed to provide 
insurance for the benefit of its tenant, Salt Lake County, we 
hold that the strict construction rule does not apply, but 
instead, we follow the modern trend and conclude that the lease 
clearly imposes the responsibility for providing fire insurance 
on the landlord. 
SUBROGATION AGAINST A COINSURED 
We next examine whether Safeco, nevertheless, has a right 
of subrogation against Salt Lake County. The equitable 
1. In essence, the strict construction rule provides that 
where one party has allegedly contracted to assume 
responsibility for the financial consequences of another's 
negligence, the provisions of the contract must be strictly 
construed against such coverage absent clear and unequivocal 
language. See e.g., Shell Oil v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling 
Co., 658 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1983). 
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doctrine of subrogation allows an insurer, which has paid a 
loss, to step into the shoes of its insured and recoup its 
losses from a party whose negligence caused the loss. Board of 
Educ. v. Hales, 566 P.2d 1246, 1247 (Utah 1977). However, it 
is a well-established rule that an insurer cannot recover by 
means of subrogation against its own insured or a coinsured 
under the policy. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Craftwall of Idaho, Inc., 
757 F.2d 1030, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985); Alaska Ins. Co., 623 P.2d 
at 1217; Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478, 482 (Okla. App. 
1975); Board of Educ., 566 P.2d at 1247. HAn insurer which 
accepts a premium based partially on the inclusion of a 
coinsured under a policy of insurance has assumed the risk of 
[the coinsured's] negligence.- Board of Educ., 566 P.2d at 
1247. Where the insured is required by contract or lease to 
carry insurance for the benefit of another, the other party may 
attain the status of a defacto coinsured even if not named as 
an insured in the policy obtained. 16 Couch on Insurance 2d 
§ 61:137 (Rev. Ed. 1983). In the absence of a design or fraud 
on the part of the coinsured, no subrogation may be taken 
against such party. 111. Furthermore, an insurer-subrogee 
stands in the shoes of its insured and any defenses that are 
valid against the insured are also valid against the insurer. 
Id. at § 61:212. Therefore, if the tenant is a ccinsured under 
the landlord's policy, the insurer has no right of subrogation 
against it. 
In this context, an insurer should not be 
allowed to treat a tenant, who is in 
privity with the insured landlord, as a 
negligent third party when it could not 
collect against its own insured had the 
insured negligently caused the fire. In 
effect, the tenant stands in the shoes of 
the insured landlord for the limited 
purpose of defeating a subrogation claim. 
Rizzuto v. Morris, 22 Wash. App. 951, 592 P.2d 688, 690 (1979). 
The tenant also stands in the shoes of the insured 
landlord for purposes of subrogation claims brought in the 
names of tenants not parties to the lease. When Safeco agreed 
to provide insurance for the building it assumed the risk of 
its coinsureds1 negligence. See Board of Educ., 566 P.2d at 
1247. "The insurer, which has accepted one premium covering 
the entire property and has assumed the risk of the negligence 
of each insured party, ought not to be allowed to shift the 
risk to any one of them.- I&. at 1248 (quoting 
McBroome-Bennett Plumbing. Inc. v. Villa France Inc., 515 
S.W.2d 32, 44 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (Guittard, J., dissenting)). 
- 870553-CA 
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CONCLUSION 
We hold that the lease is not ambiguous and that Salt 
Lake County is a McoinsuredM under its provisions. Fashion 
Place included Salt Lake County within the scope of insurance 
coverage called for under the lease. Therefore/ Safeco has no 
right to pursue a subrogation claim against Salt Lake County. 
Accordingly/ the judgment belovA is affirmed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench/ Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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fJ AN i.sisar-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FASHION PLACE INVESTMENT, LTD., 
a partnership, aka FASHION 
PLACE ASSOCIATES, et al. , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, HOLMES & ANDERSON, 
INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Consolidated Case No. 
C-84-302 
CRAIG DeHART, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, et al., 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C-84-3100 
STEVEN J. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, J & J ELECTRIC, et al. 
Defendants. 
Civil NO. C-84-3223 
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RONALD K. GEE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, J & J ELECTRIC, et al. 
Defendants. 
THOMAS C. SORENSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
& PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, J & J ELECTRIC, et al. 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C-84-3275 
Civil No. C-84-3355 
This matter is before the court on a Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by defendant Salt Lake County/Salt Lake County 
Mental Health. A hearing on the Motion was held on January 
5, 1987. After oral argument the Court took the matter under 
advisement to review the lengthy legal authorities submitted. 
The Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact 
concerning the intent of the parties. Accordingly, defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
FACTS 
T h i s c a s e i s a s u b r o g a t i o n a c t i o n f o r p r o p e r t y damage and 
b u s i n e s s i n t e r r u p t i o n b r o u g h t by Safeco I n s u r a n c e Company, i n 
t h e name o f i t s i n s u r e d s , t h e owners of t h e b u i l d i n g , a g a i n s t 
d e f e n d a n t S a l t Lake C o u n t y / S a l t Lake Coun ty Menta l H e a l t h , a 
t e n a n t of t h e b u i l d i n g . 
I n 1 9 7 8 , t h e d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d i n t o a l e a s e w i t h t h e p l a i n t i f f s , 
o w n e r s o f t h e F a s h i o n P l a c e P r o f e s s i o n a l B u i l d i n g , and began 
o c c u p y i n g a p o r t i o n of t h e b u i l d i n g . On May 1, 1983 , a f i r e 
d e s t r o y e d t h e b u i l d i n g . F o l l o w i n g t h e f i r e , Sa feco I n s u r a n c e 
Company , a s i n s u r e r of t h e b u i l d i n g f o r t h e o w n e r s , expended 
sums t o r e b u i l d t h e b u i l d i n g and t o compensa te t h e owners f o r 
p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y l o s s e s a n d b u s i n e s s i n t e r r u p t i o n l o s s e s . 
S a f e c o I n s u r a n c e Company t h e n i n s t i t u t e d t h i s l a w s u i t , t o r e c o u p 
t h e l o s s e s s u s t a i n e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e a l l e g e d n e g l i g e n c e of 
S a l t Lake C o u n t y . 
The i s s u e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e C o u r t i s w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t S a l t 
L a k e C o u n t y i s a c o i n s u r e d of t h e p l a i n t i f f s , and t h u s w h e t h e r 
S a f e c o I n s u r a n c e Co. i s p r e c l u d e d from p u r s u i n g t h i s s u b r o g a t i o n 
a c t i o n . 
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SALT LAKE CO. PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DISCUSSION 
I, ABSENT AN EXPRESS AGREEMENT. A TENANT IS PRESUMED A COINSURED 
OF THE LANDLORD 
The rule is well established that an insurer cannot recover 
by means of subrogation against its own insured, or a coinsured 
under the policy. Board of Education v. Hales, 566 P.2d 1246, 
1247 (Utah 1977) ; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Craftwall of Idaho, Inc., 
757 F.2d 1030, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985); Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA 
Alaska Communications, Inc., 623 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Alaska 1981); 
Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478, 482 (Okla.App. 1975), Indeed, 
the Utah Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that "where 
an insurance company attempts to recover, as a subrogee, from 
a coinsured under a fire insurance policy, the action must fail 
in the absence of design or fraud on the part of the coinsured." 
Hales, 566 P.2d at 1247. 
Moreover, in cases where a landlord is obligated to provide 
fire insurance on the leased premises, the landlord is presumed 
to carry insurance for the tenant's benefit, and thus the tenant 
is presumed to be a coinsured, in the absence of an express 
agreement to the contrary. Alaska Ins. . 623 P.2d at 1218; Rizzuto 
v. Morris, 22 Wash.App. 951, 592 P.2d 688, 690 (1979) (citing 
Rock Sorinas Realty, Inc. v. Waid, 392 S.W. 2d 270, 278 (Mo. 1965)); 
Monterey Corp. v. Hart, 216 Va. 843, 224 S.E.2d 142, 146 (1976); 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
S u t t o n , 532 P . 2 d a t 4 8 2 ; a c c o r d , R. Kee ton , I n s u r a n c e Law, S e c t i o n 
4 . 4 ( b ) a t 210 (1971) ( s u g g e s t i n g a d o p t i o n of r u l e t o b a r l a n d l o r d ' s 
i n s u r e r from p r o c e e d i n g a g a i n s t n e g l i g e n t t e n a n t when l e a s e 
i s ambiguous and i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y i s s i l e n t o r a m g i g u o u s ) . 
I n t h i s c a s e , i t i s c l e a r t h a t p l a i n t i f f / l a n d l o r d assumed 
an o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o v i d e f i r e i n s u r a n c e f o r b o t h t h e l e a s e d 
p r e m i s e s and t h e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y of S a l t Lake C o u n t y . 1 A c c o r d -
i n g l y , t h e d e f e n d a n t / t e n a n t i s presumed a c o i n s u r e d , t h u s b a r r i n g 
a n y a c t i o n by means of s u b r o g a t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e i n s u r e r , 
u n l e s s t h e p a r t i e s e x p r e s s l y c o n t r a c t e d o t h e r w i s e . The p i v o t a l 
q u e s t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , i s w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t , S a l t Lake Coun ty , 
and p l a i n t i f f s , owners of t h e Fash ion P l a c e P r o f e s s i o n a l B u i l d i n g , 
e x p r e s s l y c o n t r a c t e d t h a t S a l t Lake County would assume l i a b i l i t y 
f o r f i r e damage r e s u l t i n g from i t s own n e g l i g e n t a c t s . 
P a r a g r a p h 9 of t h e Lease Agreement be tween t h e p l a i n t i f f / 
1 M \ & 1 O * 3 1 ^*vi t k e <i^fetvi^rvt/tet\e.rvt p rov ide r • • 
9 . R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r u t i l i t i e s , t a x e s , 
and i n s u r a n c e s h a l l be a s i n d i c a t e d : 
P o w e r ( L ) , H e a t ( L ) , W a t e r ( L ) , 
S e w e r ( L ) , T e l e p h o n e ( T ) , R e a l 
P r o p e r t y T a x ( L ) , I n c r e a s e i n 
R e a l P r o p e r t y Tax (L) , F i r e I n s u r a n c e 
on B u i l d i n g ( L I , F i r e I n s u r a n c e 
on P e r s o n a l P r o p e r t y ( L ) , G l a s s 
I n s u r a n c e ( L ) . 
(Emphas i s added) 
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II, AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES 
A. Provisions of Lease 
In recent years several courts have considered whether 
to deny a cause of action to landlords and the right of subrogation 
to their insurers when the landlord covenants to carry fire 
insurance on the leased premises and the fire damage is allegedly 
due to the negligence of the tenant, Aetna Ins, Co. v. Craftwall 
of Idaho, Inc. , 757 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1985) ; Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCk 
Alaska Communications, Inc., 623 P.2d 1216 (Alaska 1981); Rizzuto 
v. Morris, 22 Wash.App. 951, 592 P.2d 688, 690 (1979); Sutton 
v, Jondahl. 532 P.2d 478 (Okla.App. 1975) • 
In Alaska Ins. , the most analogous case, the landlord's 
insurer brought an action against the insured's tenant for negligence 
in causing fire loss. In determining whether to deny the cause 
of action, the Alaska Ins. court stated the controlling principle 
as follows: 
Absent an express provision in the l e a s e 
e s t a b l i s h i n g the t e n a n t ' s l i a b i l i t y for 
l o s s from negl igent ly started f i r e s , the 
trend has been to find that the insurance 
obtained was for the mutual benefit of both 
p a r t i e s , and that the tenant "stands in 
the shoes of the insured landlord for the 
l i m i t e d purpose of defeating a subrogation 
claim." 
Alaska I n s . , 623 P.2d at 1218 ( c i ta t ions omitted) (Emphasis 
added). 
APP-14 
FASHION PLACE V. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
T h i s Cour t a g r e e s w i t h t h e A l a s k a Supreme C o u r t ' s s t a t e m e n t 
of t h e a p p l i c a b l e law, b u t a p p l i e s t h i s p r i n c i p l e d i f f e r e n t l y . 
The l e a s e a t i s s u e i n A l a s k a I n s , and t h e l e a s e p r o v i s i o n s 
i n t h e c a s e b e f o r e t h i s Cour t a r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r . Both 
l e a s e s c o n t a i n a r e d e l i v e r y c l a u s e s t a t i n g t h a t t h e b u i l d i n g 
w o u l d b e r e t u r n e d i n good c o n d i t i o n , e x c e p t i n g f a i r wear and 
t e a r o r damage c a u s e d by f i r e , p r o v i d e d t h o s e damages d i d n o t 
a r i s e f rom t h e d i r e c t n e g l i g e n c e of t h e l e s s e e . 2 Both l e a s e s 
a l s o c o n t a i n an i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n a g r e e m e n t whereby t h e l e s s e e 
a g r e e d t o indemnify and h o l d t h e l e s s o r h a r m l e s s from and a g a i n s t 
l o s s , damage and l i a b i l i t y a r i s i n g from t h e n e g l i g e n t a c t s of 
The r e d e l i v e r y p r o v i s i o n i n A l a s k a I n s . p r o v i d e s : 
I I . COVENANTS OF THE LESSEE: 
b . L e s s e e s h a l l u s e s a i d p r e m i s e s f o r l a w f u l b u s i n e s s 
p u r p o s e s and w i l l l e a v e s a i d p r e m i s e s a t 
t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f t h i s l e a s e i n a s good 
a c o n d i t i o n a s r e c e i v e d , e x c e p t i n g f a i r 
w e a r and t e a r a n d / o r l o s s o r damage caused 
b y f i r e , e x p l o s i o n , e a r t h q u a k e o r o t h e r 
c a s u a l t y ; p r o v i d e d t h a t s u c h c a s u a l t y was 
n o t caused by t h e n e g l i g e n t a c t of t h e L e s s e e , 
i t s employees o r a g e n t s . . . . 
A l a s k a I n s . . 623 P .2d a t 1 2 1 8 . The r e d e l i v e r y p r o v i s i o n 
i n t h i s c a s e p r o v i d e s : 
7 . At t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e t e r m of t h i s 
l e a s e , LESSEE w i l l y i e l d and d e l i v e r up 
t h e PREMISES t o LESSOR i n a s good o r d e r 
a n d c o n d i t i o n a s when e n t e r e d upon by t h e 
LESSEE, r e a s o n a b l e u s e and w e a r t h e r e o f , 
damage by f i r e and c a s u a l t y n o t t h e f a u l t 
o f LESSEE and damage b y e l e m e n t s e x c e p t e d 
t h e r e f r o m . 
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t h e l e s s e e , 3 A d d i t i o n a l l y , b o t h l e a s e a g r e e m e n t s c o n t a i n a 
p r o v i s i o n t h a t t h e l a n d l o r d w o u l d o b t a i n and keep i n f o r c e a 
D o l i c y of i n s u r a n c e t o c o v e r l o s s by f i r e . 4 
The i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n p r o v i s i o n i n A laska I n s . s t a t e s : 
I I . COVENANTS OF THE LESSEE: 
c . L e s s e e a g r e e s t o i n d e m n i f y and h o l d L e s s o r h a r m l e s s 
f rom and a g a i n s t l o s s , damage and l i a b i l i t y 
a r i s i n g from t h e n e g l i g e n t a c t of L e s s e e , 
i t s a g e n t s , e m p l o y e e s , o r c l i e n t s ; 
I d . a t 1218 . S i m i l a r l y , t h e i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n p r o v i s i o n 
i n t h i s c a s e s t a t e s : 
16 (a ) LESSEE s h a l l i n d e m n i f y and s a v e 
LESSOR h a r m l e s s from a l l l o s s , damage, l i a b i l i t y , 
o r e x p e n s e i n c u r r e d b y LESSOR due t o t h e 
e x c l u s i v e n e g l i g e n t a c t s o r o m i s s i o n s t o 
a c t o f LESSEE, i t s o f f i c e r s , e m p l o y e e s , 
o r a g e n t s a r i s i n g o u t o f LESSEE'S u s e o r 
o p e r a t i o n o f t h e PREMISES and s h a l l n o t 
p e r m i t a n y l i e n o r o t h e r c l a i m o r demand 
t o b e e n f o r c e d a g a i n s t t h e PREMISES by r e a s o n 
of LESSEEfS u s e of t h e PREMISES. 
4
 The i n s u r a n c e c l a u s e i n A l a s k a I n s . p r o v i d e s : 
I I I . MUTUAL COVENANTS OF LESSOR AND LESSEE: 
c . L e s s o r a g r e e s t o p a y a l l t a x e s and a s s e s s m e n t s made 
a g a i n s t a n d l e v i e d u p o n s a i d p r o p e r t y . 
L e s s o r s h a l l o b t a i n and keep i n f o r c e d u r i n g 
t h e ~term of t h i s l e a s e a p o l i c y o r p o l i c i e s 
o f i n s u r a n c e c o v e r i n g l o s s o r d a m a g e s t o 
t h e p r e m i s e s p r o v i d i n g p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t 
a l l p e r i l s and r i s k s i n c l u d i n g b u t n o t l i m i t e d 
t o t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of f i r e , e x t e n d e d 
c o v e r a g e , vanda l i sm and m a l i c i o u s mischief . . . . 
I d . a t 1 2 1 9 . The i n s u r a n c e c l a u s e i n t h e c a s e a t 
b a r p r o v i d e s : 
9 . R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r u t i l i t i e s , t a x e s , 
and i n s u r a n c e s h a l l b e a s i n d i c a t e d : 
P o w e r ( L ) \ H e a t ( L ) , W a t e r (L) , 
S e w e r ( L ) , T e l e p h o n e ( T ) , R e a l 
P r o p e r t y T a x (L) , I n c r e a s e i n 
Rea l P r o p e r t y Tax (L) , F i r e I n s u r a n c e 
on B u i l d i n g ( L ) , F i r e I n s u r a n c e 
on P e r s o n a l P r o p e r t y ( L ) , G l a s s 
I n s u r a n c e ( L ) . 
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A l a s k a I n s . , the court determined t h a t " t h e r e d e l i v e r y 
and i n d e m n i t y p r o v i s i o n s r e l i e d upon by AIC [ i m / . u r e r ] , when 
r e a d i r •—rr"5 i;r. -~ * * i,p t ". \ [>. i n s u r a n c e c l a u s e of I I I . c , f a l 1 
lii c i e / . . . e s t a b l i s h RCA's [ t e n a n t ' s ] l i a b i l i t y f o r f i r e damage 
c a u s e d . ;- r • ., - n e g l i g e n c e , " Alaska I n s , , ^23 l J .2d a t 1219, 
A c c o r d i n g l y - - ;•::-: ^"'^ th--1- ^he i n s u r e r c o u l d n o t 
" e x e r c i s e ' ^h^ r i g h t of s u b r o g a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e tenant" t o r e c o v e r 
for t h e n e g l i g e n c e and af f i rmed t * .: • f s g r a n t of summary 
judgmer - : s s u e . Id., a t 1220. 
Contrary t o t h e p o s i t i o n taken by t h e nui - * ,. ^.„o~ing 
t h e r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n s of rh.; j t ,-ase a*- i s s u e . . Alaska I n s . , 5 
t h i s C:-.)'M ^ f i n d s t h e s i m i l a r ' p r o v i s i o n s - l e a s e * 0.2 r 
t.o bo In c d n f l i c t ., \ cons ider ing t:h- ndemnity 
p r o v i s i o n s i n eon i * in surance c l a u s e , * •...> C;i.rt 
C h i e f J u s t i c e Rabinowi tz , d i s s e n t i n g , found t h a t t h e 
p a r t i e s d i d i n c l u d e an express p r o v i s i o n i n t h e l e a s e 
e s t a b l i s h i n g l i a b i l i t y on the t e n a n t f o r f i r e s caused 
by t h e n e g l i g e n t a c t s of t h e t e n a n t . The d i s s e n t 
f u r t h e r n o t e d , however , t h a t i f t h e l e a s e p r o v i s i o n s 
w e r e f o u n d i n c o n s i s t e n t , s u c h would l e a v e g e n u i n e 
i s s u e s o f m a t e r i a l f a c t concerning t h e i n t e n t of t h e 
p a r t i e s and summary judgment would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e . 
Alaska I n s . , 623 P . 2d a t 1220'. 
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finds there is an ambiguity in the lease. The landlord did 
not specifically and expressly reserve its insurer's rights 
to subrogate against its tenant for fires negligently caused. 
Absent such an express agreement, the Court is unable to determine 
from the lease itself what the parties intended. Accordingly, 
it is appropriate to look beyond the four corners of the lease 
and consider extrinsic evidence as to who the parties intended 
to bear the burden of loss in the case of a fire allegedly caused 
by a negligent tenant, but covered by the landlord's insurance. 
Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981). 
B. Intent of Parties 
The Courtfs review of the cases in this area leads her 
to conclude that the intent of the parties is the primary factor 
considered by the courts in construing exemption provisions 
of the parties1 lease. Rizzuto v. Morris, 22 Wash.App. 951, 
592 P.2d 688, 691 (1979); see also, Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA Alaska 
Communications, Inc., 623 P.2d 1216, 1220 (Alaska 1981) (Rabinowitz, 
C.J., dissenting). The facts thus far developed are insufficient 
to determine the intent of the parties. Accordingly, the Court 
denies defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In an effort, 
however, to aid the parties in the development of the facts 
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r e g a ' intpn*" n f +"he p a r t i e s , t h e Court notes s e v e r a l 
f a c t o r s cons idered by t h e Rizzuto cour t which Mm. ','.,-utt f inds 
p e r s u a s i v e . 
I n R i z z u t o , l e s s o r s b r o u g h t an ac t i on again:;- t h - l e s s e e 
for l o s s e s a l l e g e d l y s u s t a i n e d due t " • :• .;::;; : . - n b u i l d i n g 
in a f i r e c.iusei] by \\\Q, n e g l i g e n c e of the l e s s e e ' s employee. 
The Washington Court of Appeals -determined t h a t the lessee was 
no t l i a b l e for t h e f i r e damage, arei hhr» insurance company had 
no r i g h i or s u b r o g a t i o n ! based upon t h e undisupted t e s t imony 
of t h e p a r t i e s a t t r i a l r e g a r d i n g t h e i r iTit «MIH one , H , , 22 
Wash.App. -- * h2 P. 2d ," »< n T1 f a c t o r s considered by t h e 
• Rizzu de te rmin ing t h e intent , zt t i e par t i e s i n c l u d e : 
1. .Whether t h e le's'sors had t a k e r
 r .... i b i l i t y of 
i n s u r i n g *:he leased ..' adequate amount a g a i n s t t h e 
i i s k >•; 
2 . i-t SO; v n e t n e r t n e l e s s e e was awa^ "h i s a c t i o n ; 
3 . Whethet t h^ le.bbce u n d e r s t o o d * ee -n ; - - exempt 
i> i i urn l i a b i l i t y i o r a l l . f i r e s i n c l u d i n g those u i i» . inent 
o r i g i n ; 
4 . Whether ' ne l e s s o r a d j u s t e d i t s r e n t a l r a t e upward 
t o compensate for the f i r e insurance coverage. Id . , 2 ,< Vhj„.h 
App. 951, 592 P«2d a t 6 " . 
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CONCLUSION 
T h e C o u r t e m p h a s i z e s t h a t s h e a g r e e s w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t 
of p o l i c y a s summarized by Kee ton , I n s u r a n c e Law# S e c t i o n 4 . 4 ( b ) 
a t 210 ( 1 9 7 1 ) : 
P r o b a b l y i t i s u n d e s i r a b l e , from t h e p o i n t 
o f v i e w of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , t h a t t h e r i s k 
of l o s s from a f i r e n e g l i g e n t l y c a u s e d by 
a l e s s e e b e u p o n t h e l e s s e e r a t h e r t h a n 
t h e l e s s o r ' s i n s u r e r . Al lowing t h e l e s s o r ' s 
i n s u r e r t o p r o c e e d a g a i n s t t h e l e s s e e i s 
s u r e l y c o n t r a r y t o e x p e c t a t i o n s of p e r s o n s 
o t h e r t h a n t h o s e who h a v e b e e n e x p o s e d t o 
t h i s b i t o f l aw e i t h e r d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s 
f o r a l e a s e o r e l s e a f t e r a l o s s . . . . 
[ P ] e r h a p s [ t h e c o u r t s ] s h o u l d a t l e a s e a d o p t 
a r u l e a g a i n s t a l l o w i n g t h e l e s s o r ' s i n s u r e r 
t o p r o c e e d a g a i n s t t h e l e s s e e when l e a s e 
p r o v i s i o n s a r e a m b i g u o u s i n t h i s r e g a r d 
and t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y i s s i l e n t o r a m b i g u o u s . 
T h e C o u r t n o t e s t h a t , a b s e n t an e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n i n t h e l e a s e 
t o t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e o r e s u m o t i o n i s t h a t t h e l e s s e e i s a c o i n s u r e d 
of t h e l e s s o r , t h u s b a r r i n g a s u b r o g a t i o n a c t i o n by t h e i n s u r e r 
a g a i n s t i t s own i n s u r e d . The C o u r t a l s o b e l i e v e s , h o w e v e r , 
t h a t t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e l e a s e s h o u l d be a b l e t o c o n t r a c t a r o u n d 
s u c h a p r e s u m p t i o n . I n t h i s c a s e , i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s 
a t t e m p t e d t o do j u s t t h a t . 6 However, i n t h e C o u r t ' s v i e w t h e 
T h e C o u r t n o t e s t h a t t h e l e a s e a t i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e 
i s n o t a n a d h e s i o n c o n t r a c t ; r a t h e r , i t was p r e p a r e d 
and d r a f t e d by a t t o r n e y s f o r S a l t Lake County . P l a i n t i f f s ' 
Memorandum i n O p p o s i t i o n , a t p . 1 8 . 
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provision:; drat Led are ambiguous- Accordingly, extrinsic evidence 
as to the parties1 intentions must be considered ini defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, i s denied. 
Dated this 14th day of January, 1987. 
JUDITH M. BILLINGS f I 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FASHION PLACE INVESTMENT, LTD., 
a partnership, aka FASHION 
PLACE ASSOCIATES, FASHION PLACE 
INVESTORS LTD., a limited 
partnership, CAPITOL LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, VALLEY 
MORTGAGE COMPANY, DR. ROBERT 
ANDERSON, DR. BARLOW L. PACKER, 
DR. ORLANDO T. BARROWES, DR. 
CARLSON TERRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
ZOUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, HOLLAND 
i PASKER, ARCHITECTS AND 
PLANNERS, HOLMES & ANDERSON, 
C N C , J & J ELECTRIC, DICK'S 
PLUMBING, THOMPSON & SONS 
iEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING, 
2CKMAN &. MIDGLEY CONTRACTORS, 
CHORNTON PLUMBING & HEATING, 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 1 0 , JANE 
DOES 1 THROUGH 5 , JOHN DOES 1 
THROUGH 5 , AIR CARE INDUSTRIES, 
I N C . , a n I l l i n o i s c o r p o r a t i o n , 
RULE 52 STATEMENT 
ON DECISION 
C o n s o l i d a t e d 
C i v i l No . C84-302 
J u d g e D a v i d Young 
( C a p t i o n s f o r C o n s o l i d a t e d 
C a s e s C84-310O; 3 2 2 3 ; 
and 3275 not shown) 
Defendants. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, et al., 
Third-Party
 t 
Plaintiffs,' 
RICHARD HARMAN, dba BUILDING 
MANAGEMENT SERVICES and SAFECO 
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
The Court, pursuant to Rule 52 (a: Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, hereby issues : :.:•;• • v .-r-i statement at 
the grounds upon* which it-:, die. , i , reached granting Salt 
Lake County1 •, Untimi Lor Partial Summary Judgment dismissing 
the. subrogation claims of Safeco Insurance Company whi-h 
Motion was argued, pursuant 10 proper noi JU-, bet ore the Cour 
•on September n nil / at lht« hour of P:3G a.in., with the. 
.lu I a in t i £ £ i: Fashion Place • • investment, • Ltd.
 f 2 partnersh \i( 
Fashion Pi ace. Associates, Capitol -Life cAwance Company, 
Valley Mortgage Company, Dr- Robert .Anderson,.''Dr. Barlow L» 
•Packart, I1" Orlando T. Barrowes, ^ r ,v... *arry 
being represented by Theodore E. Kanell 1 *-. 1 
Braithwaite, and the plaintiff .:v«t~r~ 7/--., 
being represented l:y Ttieorcioro E. Kane. , John 
BiMithwaite and David 01 sen; the defendant Salt Lake 
County/Salt Lake County Mental Hea- - esented by Gary 
l! Ferguson, Gar I .rohn::ou o: •* . . . :: . . Hyde; -r.-: • 
defendant. Air Care industries, Inc., being represented . • 
Wallace R. Lauchnor. After hearing oral *rqui - t::d 
2 
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reviewing the pleadings on file, the Court granted Salt Lake 
County's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing the 
subrogation claims of Safeco Insurance Company. The Court's 
Order was based upon the testimony listed in depositions cited 
during oral argument and in memoranda supporting the Motions 
for Summary Judgment, the law of the case as determined by 
Judge Judith L. Billings, and the law cited by counsel for Salt 
Lake County in their Brief in support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
The Court notes that, with the exception of certain 
uninsured loss, the above action is a subrogation action filed 
by Safeco Insurance Company in the names of its insureds. By 
earlier Memorandum Decision, Judge Judith L. Billings 
determined that Salt Lake County was presumed to be a 
co-*insured of the lessors, and therefore an insured of 
Safeco Insurance ComDanv, thus barring subrogation claims of 
Safeco Insurance Company, against Salt Lake County which 
subrogation claims arose out of the May 1, 1983 fire. Judge 
Billings further found that this presumption could be overcome 
by an express showing in the Lease that Salt Lake County was 
not to be a co-insured of the lessors. Judge Billings 
concluded: 
The court also believes, however, that the 
parties of the Lease should be able to 
contract around such a presumption. In 
this case, it appears that the parties 
attempted to do just that. [footnote 
omitted.] However, in the Court's view, 
the provisions drafted are ambiguous. 
Accordingly, extrinsic evidence as to the 
parties' intentions must be considered and 
3 
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defendants1 Motion for summary Judgment is 
denied. 
Memorandum Decision Judith M. Billings, District Court Judge, 
dated .January 14, 1987, Consolidated Case No, C-8 4--'! 01:. 
By Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, both, the 
plaintiffs and Gait Lake, Cuunty argue that the depositions and 
discovery ^onduoLo.d attar Judge Billings1 January 
Memorandum Decision supply the extrinsic evic-.- \ the 
parties1 intentions such that the C . .. :ar. decide, as a 
matter of law, whet!v.i: :,r ri;t there was expressed intent on the 
part - che parties to overcome the presumption tr. •* .like 
County was a co-insured with the lessor. Both parties filed 
Motions for Partial Summa: . representing that there 
vorp no rrpmnrip i-«5np<: .« :_ material facts fror* whi:r.r. * \e 
intent of the parties could e determine*- ral 
.arcrument. no genuine issue- • jny material fact v?, 
raised h^ ^-^er party, . _;,vrt found none t; ^ x:^* 
In reaching the above decision t ? ;:. .
 ;i 
Judcre Billinas1 Memorandum Decisic ; •• i./.;ir; . ; ,?37 as 
"cne xaw 01 uie case, inn onxy issue remaining * i:-^ determined 
by the C'.rur't" iA\ rue issue of whether Salt Lake Coun* . ; A 
co-insured was whether or not "extrir - . * th-'» 
• parties' intentions" establishes] an express intent to waive 
Salt Lake Couni'/1:; protection from subrogation by Safeco. 
The -Juurt specifically adopts and applies ..Judge Bil LIIQ:; ' 
conclusion that: 
The court notes that, absent an express 
provision in the lease to the contrary, the 
presumption is that the lessee is a 
7\r>"D — O R 
co-lnaurad of a lessor, thus barring a 
subrogation action by the insurer against 
its own insured. 
Memorandum Decision. 
The Court basis its Order granting Salt Lake County's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the grounds that the 
undisputed material facts establish that there was no expressed 
intent on the part of the parties to the Lease to reserve to 
Safeco Insurance Company the right to subrogate against Salt 
Lake County. Therefore, Salt Lake County is presumed to be a 
co-insured of Safeco, thereby barring any subrogation by 
Safeco against Salt Lake County for any claims paid by 
Safeco as a result of the May 1, 1983. 
Further, the Court basis its decision granting Salt 
Lake County's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
Courtfs determination that, as a matter of law, paragraphs 9 
and 19 of the March 1, 1981 Lease are pre-loss releases by 
the lessors of any subrogation claims that Safeco may have as 
a result of the May 1, 1983 fire. The Court specifically notes 
that Judge Billings did not rule on this issue of pre-loss 
release. 
DATED this oil day of September, 1987. 
*YxTHE COURT: 
The Honorable pavad S. Young 
' . s t r i c t / CcJvtt ~ " 
SOFTEST 
Third Distr  our Judge 
H. DSXCW KJWCXJEY 
~ Ota** 
By ^— T &-CC<^ __ 
Dcv. 
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